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U.S. Officials' Vulnerability to "Global
Justice": Will Universal Jurisdiction over
War Crimes Make Traveling for Pleasure
Less Pleasurable?
AMANDA L. MORGAN*
Whether it takes only a few years or the thirty it has taken to
initiate proceedings against Pinochet, those officials accused of
war crimes will be brought to justice.'
INTRODUCTION
Several months after the gruesome images from Abu Ghraib filled
American airwaves and cyberspace, the Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) filed a criminal complaint in Germany against high-ranking U.S.
political and military leaders.' The CCR petitioned for an investigation
and prosecution of U.S. officials under the German 2002 Code of Crimes
Against International Law (CCAIL).3 The CCAIL criminalizes grave
breaches of the four Geneva Conventions and violations of the laws of
war, as defined under customary international law.' Under the CCAIL,
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2oo6. The author
would like to thank Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza for sharing her knowledge and passion for human
rights law. She would also like to thank Christopher Lockard, Kathleen Kizer and the editors of the
Hastings Law Journal for their dedicated work, as well as her family and friends for their
encouragement and support along the way.
i. Michael Ratner & Peter Weiss, Litigating Against Torture. The German Criminal Prosecution,
Center for Constitutional Rights [hereinafter Litigating Against Torture], at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/viewpoints/viewpoint.asp?ObjlD=Ezqtiejl5g&Content=536 (last visited Mar. 17, 2005) . The
Center for Constitutional Rights is a U.S.-based human rights legal organization. Id.
2. Id.; see also Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld Threatens US-German Relations, Deutsche Welle, Dec.
14, 2004, available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/o,1564,1427743,oo.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2005) [hereinafter Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld].
3. Litigating Against Torture, supra note i; see Vo1kerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB) v. 30.6.2002
(BGBI. I S.2254) [Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes Against International Law of 26 June 2002]
[hereinafter CCAIL] (Ge.), translated at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutesfVoeStGB.pdf (June 26,
2002) by the German Federal Ministry of Justice; see also Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law, Draft of an Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes against International
Law, at http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/legaltextVStGBengl.pdf (Dec. 28, 2001) (English
translation and explanation of the CCAIL) [hereinafter Translated CCAIL].
4. CCAIL, supra note 3, § 8; Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
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the direct commission of crimes is criminalized as well as actions by
superiors who knew or should have known that a subordinate was about
to commit a crime and failed to prevent it.' The CCAIL also establishes
that German courts have universal jurisdiction over war crimes and
crimes against humanity, which enables Germany to prosecute any
suspects of these international crimes, regardless of where they are
located and their connections or lack of connections to the German
forum.6
The CCR named Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former
CIA Director George Tenet, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence
Steven Cambone, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Brigadier
General Janis Karpinski, Army Colonel Pappas, Major General Walter
Wojdakowski, and other high-level officers who served in Iraq in the
16o-page report filed with the German prosecutor in Karlsruhe,
Germany.7 The CCR later amended the complaint to include U.S.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, after his admission at his
confirmation hearings that he had participated in the drafting and
approval of legal memoranda which authorized torture and inhumane
treatment of detainees.8
The Bush administration, after refusing to ratify the Statute of the
International Criminal Court signed by the Clinton administration
(Rome Statute), has pursued a policy to ensure that the International
Criminal Court (ICC) will not obtain jurisdiction over American citizens
involved in military operations overseas.9 The administration has
5. CCAIL, supra note 3, §§ 3-4; see Litigating Against Torture, supra note I.
6. CCAIL, supra note 3, § I; see Litigating Against Torture, supra note I. But see Code of
Criminal Procedure, § 15 3f (Ge.), translated in Translated CCAIL, supra note 3, at 16 (labeled as
"Article 3: Amendment to Code of Criminal Procedure"). Although the CCAIL requires no link to
Germany in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, section 153f of the Code of
Criminal Procedure instructs the public prosecutor to exercise discretion in proceeding with cases in
which there is not a tie to Germany, and to defer to an international court or state that does have ties
to the crime, defendant or victim. NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 191 (2005).
7. Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2; Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
8. Center for Constitutional Rights, Gonzales Added to War Crimes Complaint in Germany;
New Evidence Shows Fay Report On Abu Ghraib Protected Officials, at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjlD=ci38xk7IHk&Content= 5 o9 (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). CCR Vice
President Peter Weiss stated that Gonzales' testimony in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee
"demonstrates his involvement in setting policy where torture and inhumane treatment was authorized
at the highest levels of the Bush Administration." Id. Referencing Gonzales' claim that aliens in U.S.
custody overseas are not protected by the prohibition on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,
Weiss stated "this makes clear that Gonzales and the Bush Administration continue to believe that
non-citizens held outside the U.S. can be treated inhumanely." Id.; see also Litigating Against Torture,
supra note I.
9. Jeffrey S. Dietz, Protecting the Protectors: Can the United States Successfully Exempt U.S.
Persons from the International Criminal Court with U.S. Article 98 Agreements?, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L.
137, 138-39 (2004). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July
17, 5998, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
[VOL. 57:423
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instigated a series of bilateral agreements, called "Article 98
Agreements," to gain commitments from other states not to extradite
U.S. citizens to the ICC.'° The threat of prosecution in a forum outside
U.S. jurisdiction is exactly the scenario that the Bush administration
hoped to avoid through these Article 98 Agreements."
In the past, the Bush administration has used political pressure to
abort foreign attempts to prosecute U.S. citizens under national universal
jurisdiction laws. 2 For example, when a case was filed in Belgium against
General Tommy Franks for his actions in the Iraq war, the United States
coerced Belgium into revising its law to exclude this type of
prosecution.'3 After the administration threatened to cut off funding for a
new NATO headquarters in Brussels, the Belgian government complied
with the United States' request.'4 It was not unexpected that the United
States would pursue a political solution in response to the CCR's
complaint as well, and the Bush administration brought similar pressure
to bear on the German government.'5 The Pentagon threatened that
"frivolous lawsuits" could harm the U.S.-German relationship,' 6 and
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated he would not attend the annual
Munich security conference."
The CCR saw the German court as the court of last resort based on
the documented unwillingness of the U.S. government to investigate the
involvement of all but the lowest level of participants in the Abu Ghraib
crimes." The German special prosecutor ultimately dismissed the
International Criminal Court (ICC), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Rome Statute] created the ICC to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
crimes of aggression. One hundred states have ratified the Rome Statute. United Nations, Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treatyio.asp (July 17,
1998). The United States signed the treaty on December 31, 2000, but never ratified it. Id.
Io. Dietz, supra note 9, at 138-39.
ii. Id. See also PINOCHET EFFECT, supra note 6, at 218-19 ("[A]ttempts to question Henry
Kissinger no doubt helped solidify [U.S.] opposition to the International Criminal Court in both the
legislative and executive branch.").
t2. Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2; Litigating Against Torture, supra note t.
13. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183, 189 n.28 (2004); Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2;
Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
14. PINOCHET EFFECT, supra note 6, at io; Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 189 n.28; Lawsuit
Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2; Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
15. Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2 ("Indicating the US planned to play a similar game of
hardball with Germany [as it did with Belgium], Rumsfeld has informed the German government via
the US embassy that he will not take part in the annual Munich security conference in February
should the investigation proceed."); Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
16. Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2.
17. Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2; Litigating Against Torture, supra note 1.
t8. Litigating Against Torture, supra note I; see also Scott Horton, Expert Report, Center for
Constitutional Rights, (Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september-i xth/docs/
ScottHortonGermanyos3IO5.pdf [hereinafter Horton, Expert Report]. Scott Horton is Chair of the
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complaint, not based on any dispute over the allegations of war crimes by
high-ranking officials, but out of deference to the U.S. government to
perform its own investigation.'9 The German prosecutor concluded,
despite weighty evidence to the contrary, that "there are no indications
that the authorities and courts of the United States of America are
refraining from, or would refrain from, penal measures as regards
violations in the complaint."2
The CCR is pursuing two avenues of appeal by asking the
prosecutor to reconsider his decision and by directly petitioning the
German court.2' Even if these measures do not result in an investigation
and prosecution during this administration, the threat of prosecution for
these officials will not easily disappear." There are no statutes of
limitations on war crimes and crimes against humanity under
international law, 3 and victims of these crimes do not easily come to
terms with their traumatic experiences without seeing justice served."
The CCR, representing Iraqi torture victims in this quest for
accountability, promises that whether "it takes only a few years or the
thirty it has taken to initiate proceedings against Pinochet, those officials
accused of war crimes will be brought to justice." 5
The failure of the political branches to instigate or allow an
independent investigation of high-ranking officials' involvement and
culpability for the crimes committed at Abu Ghraib creates at least two
problems: it allows for the perception and possibility that U.S. officials
may commit war crimes through U.S. military operations with impunity;
and it contributes to the likelihood that U.S. citizens traveling overseas
will be hauled into criminal courts in foreign jurisdictions where the U.S.
government cannot guarantee their rights to due process and a fair trial.
The solution is simple: provide domestic checks and balances to the
activities of the U.S. political branches through independent, transparent
investigation mechanisms so that the task of ensuring U.S. accountability
Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Director of
the International Law Association, and Adjunct Professor of Law at Columbia University, where he
lectures on international law and international humanitarian law. Id. para. i. Horton prepared the
Expert Report on "whether in fact a proper criminal investigation of the matters covered in the
criminal complaint would be conducted in the United States so that a reasonable basis would exist to
defer action so as to allow United States authorities to act." Id. para. 2. Horton's Expert Report was
filed with the German Prosecutor along with the 16o-page complaint. Litigating Against Torture, supra
note i.




23. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 567 (6th ed. 2003); see, e.g., CCAIL,
supra note 3, § 5; Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 29.




for political and military actions overseas is not left to the international
community.
Failure to investigate these alleged crimes domestically may spur the
international community to intervene. Any resulting legal actions may
create additional legal precedent for prosecuting foreign nationals in
foreign forums through universal jurisdiction. While use of universal
jurisdiction may be appropriate in some cases, as the only method of
bringing "enemies [of] all mankind" to justice, some issues pertaining to
the protection of individual rights are unresolved." The concern is that
prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction will be subject to politically
motivated investigations, result in multiple prosecutions of an individual
for the same crime, or be vulnerable to other violations of due process.27
This potential for abuse through the proverbial "slippery slope" makes
some U.S. citizens wary.
The Bush administration's current use of political tools and pressure
like a bandage to cover up the truth and avoid both domestic and
international investigation and prosecution is not just a temporary
solution; it is, in fact, part of the problem. Allowing impunity to fester
within our political and military ranks, hidden beneath shallow political
gamesmanship, corrodes our democracy and tarnishes our credibility.
There is no telling what will be revealed once the bandage is pulled off.
And, with the inevitability of changing political tides, ultimately the
bandage will be pulled off. The question that remains is: by whom?
Part I of this note describes the status of universal jurisdiction over
international crimes as it currently stands under international law. Part II
will explain the application of the German Criminal Code's universal
jurisdiction provisions to alleged U.S. war crimes committed in Iraq.
Finally, Part III postulates that domestic accountability through
independent investigation is the only tenable solution to the "threat" of
global justice.
26. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives
and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 8i, 98 (2ooi).
27. Id. But see PINOCHET EFFECT, supra note 6, at 184, which states:
[N]ot all courts are equally independent or equally free of pressure or equally solicitous of
the rights of the accused and the victims. In the hands of the wrong court, a prosecution
could turn into either a witchhunt or a whitewash. On the other hand, the same is true for
prosecutions based on any other ground of jurisdiction. Most politicized or unfair trials are
run-of-the-mill territorial affairs, and in these no one argues that the courts have no
jurisdiction. Instead rules to determine what constitutes a fair trial, basic but still
meaningful, can be found in the core global and regional treaties on human rights and the
dozens of Guidelines, Principles and other such documents crafted by international lawyers
and judges over the years. The rules specify such bedrock principles as an independent
judiciary, the accused's right to a lawyer and to not incriminate himself, the rule against ex
post facto charges, and the like. If states implementing universal jurisdiction fail to respect




I. THE EVOLUTION OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Under international law, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is a
right of sovereign states.S Consequently, the reach of a state's criminal
jurisdiction is traditionally tied to the scope of its national sovereignty.
29
States have jurisdiction over crimes occurring within their sovereign
territory, as well as extraterritorial jurisdiction in some circumstances
over crimes occurring outside of their sovereign territory that is based
upon a connection between the crime and the state.30
A. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION DEFINED
Generally, under international law, a state establishes criminal
jurisdiction based on a connection between the state and the crime.
Under this model, there are four ways that a state may find criminal
jurisdiction:3I i) territorial, in which an alleged crime is committed within
a state's territory, or a crime is committed outside of the territory with
the intent and effect of creating harm within the territory;32 2) nationality,
in which the offender is a national of the state regardless of where he or
she commits the crime;33 3) protective, in which jurisdiction is required to
protect the interests and integrity of the state;' and 4) passive
personality, in which the victim is a national of the state.35
Universal criminal jurisdiction allows states to exercise jurisdiction
over a narrow set of crimes even when there is no nexus between the
state and the criminal act. 6 Traditionally, under universal jurisdiction, a
28. See BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 299 ("The principle that the courts of the place where the
crime is committed may exercise jurisdiction has received universal recognition, and is but a single
application of the essential territoriality of sovereignty, the sum of legal competences, which a state
has.").
29. Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 89-90.
30. Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 188.
31. Gabriel Bottini, Note, Universal Jurisdiction After the Creation of the International Criminal
Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 503, 51 (2004); Eric S. Kobrick, Note, The Ex Post Facto
Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over International Crimes, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1515, 1519 (1987); see, e.g., Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 13o8, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (st Cir. 1982); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885
(5th Cir. 1967); BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 299-305.
32. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 299-300; see, e.g., United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851-52
(9th Cir. 1976.
33. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 301-02; see, e.g., King, 522 F.2d at 851; United States v. Layton,
509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal. 198i).
34. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 302-03; see, e.g., United States v. Khalje, 658 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir.
198i); United States v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715,720 (E.D.N.Y. i98i).
35. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 302; see, e.g., United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316-17
(iith Cir. 1984).
36. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554,
570 (1995) (stating "the true meaning of universal jurisdiction is that international law permits any
state to apply its laws to certain offenses even in the absence of territorial, nationality or other
accepted contacts with the offender or the victim"); Bottini, supra note 31, at 511; see, e.g.,
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state has jurisdiction over certain international crimes when the offender
is in its custody.37 However, the presence of the offender is not always
required.38 Under this pure form of universal jurisdiction, no nexus is
required between the state and the universal jurisdiction crime it wishes
to prosecute.39
Rather than nexus, the nature of the crime defines the scope of
universal jurisdiction.' A state's authority to prosecute universal
jurisdiction crimes arises from the idea that the crimes are so heinous
that they are "universally condemned."4' The international community as
a whole, including any nation which obtained custody of a perpetrator of
one of these offenses, has an interest in prosecuting because the
perpetrators are considered "the enemies of all people."42 Prosecution
based on universal jurisdiction may also be warranted where the
circumstances of the crime make it difficult to prosecute within a single
state.43
Generally, whether or not an act is lawful or unlawful is determined
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (referring to "certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and
perhaps certain acts of terrorism"); Comm. On Int'l Human Rights Law and Practice, Int'l Law Ass'n,
London Conference: Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human
Rights Offenses 21 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Human%2oRights%2oLaw/
Human.Rig.pdf (recognizing states' rights to exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and torture).
37. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 303-05.
38. According to an Amnesty International Study in 2OO, more than 120 states have universal
jurisdiction provisions, and the majority of these provisions do not indicate whether the defendant
must initially be present. PINOCHET EFFECT, supra note 6, at 192. Universal jurisdiction provisions
enacted more recently, in order to conform with the Rome Statute (creating the International
Criminal Court), demonstrate no clear trend, but the majority requires the defendant's presence in the
absence of any other link to the forum. Id. at 192-93. Furthermore, under international law, some
universal jurisdiction crimes do not require that the defendant be in custody, such as grave breaches of
the 1949 Geneva Convention. Id. at 193. Other universal jurisdiction crimes, such as torture under the
Convention Against Torture, do require custody. Id.
39. See Meron, supra note 36, at 570.
40. Principle i.1 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction states that "universal
jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the
crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the
victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction." Princeton Project on
Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 28 (2ooi), available at
http://wwwi.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/princeton.html [hereinafter Princeton Principles].
41. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985); see Kontorovich, supra note 13, at
205-06; Meron, supra note 36, at 57o; Jordan J. Paust, U.S. Schizophrenia with Respect to Prosecution
of Core International Crimes, 103 J. INT'L L. & DIPL. 58, 61 (2004).
42. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582; see Meron, supra note 36, at 570; Paust, supra note 41, at 61.
43. See Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 96 ("The rationale behind the exercise of [universal]
jurisdiction is: (I) no other state can exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the traditional doctrines; (2)
no other state has a direct interest; and (3) there is an interest of the international community to
enforce. Thus, states exercise universal jurisdiction not only as national jurisdiction, but also as a
surrogate for the international community.").
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by the law of the country where the act occurred." However, a state may
punish a perpetrator of a universal jurisdiction crime whom it has in
physical custody under its own national laws that apply to the offense
committed.45 A state invoking universal jurisdiction is thus enforcing
customary international law on behalf of the international community.
46
This shared responsibility and right to prosecute perpetrators of heinous
crimes can eliminate impunity by preventing perpetrators from finding a
"safe haven in third countries. '47
B. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION CRIMES
Universal jurisdiction is a well-recognized basis of jurisdiction for
prosecuting some offenses that are criminalized under customary
international law.4s The principle of universality establishes jurisdiction
for a state to prescribe domestic laws and to enforce sanctions for some
crimes that are independently based in international law.49 At the very
least, universality applies to crimes that "affect the international
community and are against customary international law."5° However, not
all international crimes may be universally prosecuted.'
For an international crime to be subject to universal jurisdiction
there must be explicit recognition of this jurisdiction through
international custom or convention.52 International crimes over which a
state may exercise universal jurisdiction historically include: piracy, 3 war
44. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582 (quoting Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356
(1909)).
45. Id.
46. Paust, supra note 41, at 61.
47. Arrest Warrant of is April 2000 (Congo v. BeIg.) (Feb. 14, 2002), para. 46 (Van den
Wyngaert, J., dissenting), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm;
Bottini, supra note 31, at 512; see J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 (toth ed.
1989) (stating that the reason for universal jurisdiction over certain heinous crimes is to ensure that no
such offence goes unpunished).
48. Paust, supra note 41, at 61.
49. Id.
5o. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note
36, § 404).
51. Ex parte Pinochet (Regina v. Bartle), 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1313 (H.L. 1998) (stating "[t]he fact
even that an act is recognised as a crime under international law does not mean that the Courts of all
States have jurisdiction to try it"); see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 473 (4th ed. 1997); see
also Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 788
(1988) (stating that universal jurisdiction "provides every state with jurisdiction over a limited
category of offenses"); Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to
Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 363, 368 (2OOI); Bottini, supra note 31, at 515.
52. Bottini, supra note 31, at 515; see SHAW, supra note 51, at 473.
53. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of II April 2ooo (Congo v. BeIg.) (Feb. 14, 2002), para. 5 (separate
opinion of President Guillaume); Princeton Principles supra note 40, princ. 2(1)(i); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 36, § 404; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 469 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1996); STARKE, supra note 47, at 234; Bottini, supra note 31, at 527.
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crimes, 4 genocide,"5 crimes against humanity," and torture." Currently
controversy exists as to whether terrorism,8 slave trade,59 or illicit drug
traffic6° may be included in this list." Furthermore, the determination of
what constitutes a universal crime against humanity varies across
international conventions, creating doubts as to appropriate application
54. See, e.g., Princeton Principles, supra note 40, princ. 2(I)(3); RESTATEMENT, supra note 36,
§ 404; BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 304; Bottini, supra note 31, at 531-32 (quoting The Almelo Trial
(Brit. Mil. Ct. 1945), in I LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35, 42 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n ed., 1947) in which a British military court stated "under the general doctrine called
Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, every independent state has [a]n International Law
jurisdiction to punish pirates and war criminals in its custody regardless of the nationality of the victim
or the place where the offence was committed"). See also the Geneva Conventions, which codified the
principle that "persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches" of the laws of war are subject to the jurisdiction of all the state parties. Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
236 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
55. Princeton Principles, supra note 40, princ. 2(1)(6); RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 404
(Reporter's Note I states that "[ulniversal jurisdiction to punish genocide is widely accepted as a
principle of customary law."); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 234-35 (2d ed. 1999); Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 455 (1999); Bottini, supra note 31, at 537.
56. See, e.g., Attorney-Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 298-3o4 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962) (in which
the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the right to hear charges of crimes against humanity that arose from
events prior to Israel's statehood based on the principle of universal jurisdiction); Princeton Principles,
supra note 40, princ. 2(l)(5); BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 304; Bottini, supra note 31, at 538.
57. Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 156.
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 404. But see Bottini, supra note 31, at 540 (stating that
terrorism is recognized as a crime of international concern necessitating international cooperation, but
that there exists no international consensus as to what acts constitute terrorism).
59. Bottini, supra note 31, at 526 n.112. For the proposition that slave trade is subject to universal
jurisdiction see RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 404; Princeton Principles, supra note 40, princ. 2(I)(2);
Randall, supra note 51, at 798-99; Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A
Weapon for All Nations Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT'L L. I, 9 (2000).
However, there doesn't seem to be enough state practice to reach the conclusion that slave trade is
subject to universal jurisdiction under customary law. See Roger S. Clark, Steven Spielberg's Amistad
and Other Things I Have Thought About in the Past Forty Years: International (Criminal) Law,
Conflict of Laws, Insurance and Slavery, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 371, 390 n.55 (1999).
6o. Bottini, supra note 31, at 526-27 n.112. For the proposition that illicit drug traffic is subject to
universal jurisdiction see Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, concluded on
Mar. 25, 1972, 976 U.N.T.S. 4; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 1O19 U.N.T.S.
176; Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988,
1582 U.N.T.S. 165. Similar to slave trade, existing state practice does not support the conclusion that
illicit drug traffic is subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law. See Adelheid Puttler,
Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law: Jurisdiction to Prosecute Drug Traffic Conducted by
Aliens Abroad, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 103 (Karl M. Meessen ed.,
1996).
61. Bottini, supra note 31, at 526-27 n.II2, 540.
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of universal jurisdiction over these crimes.6" For example, the RomeStatute of the ICC recognizes apartheid, enforced disappearances of
persons, and torture as crimes against humanity that are subject to
universal jurisdiction under specific treaty regimes. But universal
jurisdiction over torture may be exercised as a matter of customary
international law, outside the framework of the Convention Against
Torture. 64
C. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER
WAR CRIMES
Universal jurisdiction was first recognized for the crime of piracy,
and was uniquely applied to that crime for hundreds of years.65 At least
since the early seventeenth century, states were empowered to catch and
prosecute any pirate, regardless of the individual's nationality or location
of capture.6' According to the law of nations, a state could even
summarily execute a pirate at sea.
67
The expansion of universal jurisdiction to other crimes has only
occurred since WWII, beginning with the Nazi war crimes tribunals at
Nuremberg and the Tokyo trials.8 In addition to Nuremberg, the
Eichmann case in Israel,69 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in the United States,7"
and the Yugoslavian war crimes tribunal created by the United Nations
7
contributed to the expansion of the universal jurisdiction jurisprudence.
i. Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction Following WWII:
Nuremberg and Eichmann
The principle that it is the right, or responsibility, of states to bring
to justice individuals who committed war crimes when they are not
prosecuted by their own countries arose out of the International Military
62. Id. at 539.
63. Id. at 539-40 nn.170-72; see Rome Statute, supra note 9, at 9o . Respectively, these regimes are
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, art. 5, Nov.
30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243, 246 [hereinafter Apartheid Convention]; Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529, 153o; Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39 th Sess., 93rd Plen.
Mtg., Supp. No. 51, arts. 5, 7(0), U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture].
64. See Decisions of the Committee Against Torture Under Article 22 of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Torture or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 45 th Sess.,
Supp. No. 44, at i i i, U.N. Doc. A/4 5/44 (1990); Princeton Principles, supra note 40, princ. 2(1)(7).
65. Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 184.
66. Id. at i9o.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 185.
69. Attorney-Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
70. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (zd Cir. i98o).
71. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-1 7 (ICTY, Dec. 1o, 1998), reprinted in 38
2L.M. 317,350 ( s999).
72. Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 185.
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Tribunal (IMT), which conducted the Nuremberg trials, and the
International Military Tribunals for Asia (IMTA), which conducted the
Tokyo trials.73 In establishing the IMT to prosecute Axis leaders for
unprecedented atrocities, the Allies did not have a clear nexus to
prosecute all the Nazi crimes under existing rules of jurisdiction, since
not all crimes were committed against Allied nations.74 The tribunals
utilized universal jurisdiction, as exemplified through piracy, and
asserted that this "general doctrine" included war crimes.7" U.S. Article
III courts have subsequently held that any state may prosecute Nazi war
criminals, not just the Allied powers.7
The Israeli courts did just that in prosecuting Nazi war criminal
Adolf Eichmann in 1968." The lower court used universal jurisdiction to
prosecute an offense against the Jewish people, committed prior to the
formation of the State of Israel, holding: "The State of Israel's 'right to
punish' the Accused derives, in our view, from two cumulative sources: a
universal source (pertaining to the whole of mankind), which vests the
right to prosecute and punish crimes of this order in every state within
the family of nations; and a specific or national source, which gives the
victim nation the right to try any who assault its existence." ' The
Supreme Court reasoned that the broad principle of universal
jurisdiction extends to acts that "damage vital international interests;
73. Redress, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: Criminal Prosecutions in Europe Since 199o for
War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, Torture and Genocide, at 3, at http://www.redress.org/
documents/unijeur.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). The principle that national courts may determine
that the courts of another nation are "unable or unwilling" to investigate and prosecute is
controversial. See PINOCHET EFFECr, supra note 6, at 194-95. For example, in a case before the Spanish
Supreme Court involving the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans who were mostly
Mayan indigenous people, the majority opinion stated that "[b]asing subsidiarity on the real or
apparent inactivity of local courts implies a judgment of one state's courts about the ability to
administer justice of the similarly situated organs of another sovereign state." Id. at 170, 176. The court
implied that these types of inquiries were inappropriate for national courts to make as they might
impact foreign relations. Id. at 176. These types of determinations which might be appropriate for
international courts like the International Criminal Court, were better left to the political branches at
the national level. Id.
74. Kontorovich, supra note 13, at I95; see also Randall, supra note 51, at 802-03 (summarizing
charges brought against war criminals, many of which would not have violated domestic law and could
only be prosecuted under a universal theory).
75. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating "[i]t is generally agreed
that the establishment of these tribunals [the International Military Tribunal and the zonal tribunals
run by particular Allied countries] and their proceedings were based on universal jurisdiction");
Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 195; Randall, supra note 5i, at 8o6-io (listing Tribunal cases that
invoke universal principle).
76. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (stating
"[t]he principle that the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes are subject to
universal jurisdiction found acceptance in the aftermath of World War II").
77. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Universal Jurisdiction and the Concept of a Fair Trial: Prosecutor v.
Fulgence Niyonteze: A Swiss Military Tribunal Case Study, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 23-24
(2004); see Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 196.
78. Attorney-Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. i8, 50 (Isr. Dist. Ct. I96i).
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they impair the foundations and security of the international community
[and] violate the universal moral values and humanitarian principles that
lie hidden in the criminal law systems adopted by civilized nations."79
Though relying on universal jurisdiction, the Israeli courts could have
rested jurisdiction on the passive-personality principle, as Israel was the
state in which many of the Holocaust victims took refuge, or the
protective principle, since Israel was the sole sovereign representative of
the Jewish people.8' Universal jurisdiction principles from the Eichmann
trial have been utilized by other national courts."' For example, in 1989
the Ontario High Court of Justice accepted the concept that state courts
can exercise criminal jurisdiction over "acts which occurred outside its
territory" in Regina v. Finta.8'
In addition to a basis in customary international law, universal
jurisdiction to prosecute suspects of war crimes or to extradite them to
stand trial elsewhere, is codified in a number of international treaties.8
3
The four Geneva Conventions create a duty to prosecute or extradite
perpetrators of war crimes. State parties must prosecute or extradite
individuals suspected of commission of "grave breaches" of the Geneva
Conventions:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search
for persons alleged to have committed or to have ordered to be
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its courts. It may also, if it
prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation,
hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a
prima facie case.8
4
79. Attorney-Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 291 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
8o. Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 197.
81. See Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 161 (Ian Brownlie & Vaughan Lowe eds., 2003) (stating "[flor lack of other precedents,
[Eichmann] was for a long time at the centre of any discussion on universal jurisdiction"); see e.g.,
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [20001 I
A.C. 147, 273-76 (discussing Eichmann as a "landmark decision ... of great significance in extending
universal jurisdiction to crimes aside from piracy"); Polyukhovich v. The Commonwealth (1990 172
C.L.R. 501, 661-62 (en banc) (Austl.) (holding that international and Australian law applies universal
jurisdiction to war crimes, and that Australia's 1945 War Crimes Act grants this jurisdiction to
Australian courts).
82. 61 D.L.R. (4 th) 85, lO5-O6 (Can. 1989) (quoting the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the Steamship Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927) P.C.I.J. Ser. A No. Io):
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a state from exercising
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken
place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such
a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to states
to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory ....
83. Redress, supra note 73, at 3.
84. First Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 54,
art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 129; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 54,
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Grave breaches include: willful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and
other serious violations of the laws of war.85 Aside from the Geneva
Conventions, article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), opened for signature in 1966, is considered "to
give some recognition" to universal jurisdiction.16 Additionally, articles 5
and 7(I) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment establish universal jurisdiction over
nationals of state parties to the treaty for the crime of torture or
complicity in committing torture8' The United States is a state party to
all three of these conventions. 8
2. Universal Jurisdiction in U.S. Civil Litigation
U.S. courts have begun to adjudicate cases based solely on the
principle of universal jurisdiction.89 However, these cases have been
limited to civil litigation and situations in which the defendant is present
in the United States.' In the field of tort law, U.S. courts have exercised
universal jurisdiction over civil claims through the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).9" ATCA, as part of
the first Judiciary Act, has been on the books since 1789.92 However,
ATCA was rarely invoked until the seminal case that opened U.S.
federal courts to international human rights litigation:93 Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.4
art. 147.
85. First Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 50; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 54,
art. 51; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 53o; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 54,
art. 147.
86. Kastenberg, supra note 77, at 25-26; see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. res. 22ooA (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 2ist sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/636 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. Article 15(2) states: "Nothing in this article shall
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time it was
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of the law recognized by the community of
nations." Id.
87. Convention Against Torture, supra note 63, arts. 5, 7(0). Both the United States and
Germany are stated parties to the Convention Against Torture. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary General: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partI/chapterlV/treaty4.asp#N7 (Dec. Io, 1984).
88. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and
Reservations, at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/ (last updated Sept. 2005) (for
state parties to the ICCPR and CAT); International Humanitarian Law, State Parties & Signatories by
Treaties, at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsffWebNORM?OpenView&Start=4 3.. io6&Count=I5o&Expand
=43.I#43.1 (last visited Sept. 2005) (for state parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949).




. See id. at 202.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,878 (2d Cir. i98o).
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Filartiga was a wrongful death case in which Paraguayan citizens
alleged that a Paraguayan official had tortured their family member,
causing his death.95 The Second Circuit held that it had subject matter
jurisdiction over the case based on the principle of universal
jurisdiction." The Circuit Court stated: "for purposes of civil liability, the
torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."'  The Second Circuit's
decision, though controversial, has been followed by other circuits. 98 At
least two circuits have applied universal jurisdiction to high-profile cases
in which the defendants were foreign heads of state or senior officials."
Filartiga was a radical departure from the twenty-one prior cases
that had invoked the ATCA since the passage of the Judiciary Act in
I789.'"' Not only was jurisdiction denied in most of these cases, but none
relied on the universality principle in upholding jurisdiction."" Filartiga
broadly endorsed the universal jurisdiction principle as the basis of
jurisdiction over suits between aliens in which there was no connection to
the United States.0 2
3. The Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
The principle of universal jurisdiction was further expanded by the
U.N. Security Council's establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
95. Id. at 878-79.
96. Id. at 887.
97. Id. at 89o. The Second Circuit went on to say, "[o]ur holding today, giving effect to a
jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment
of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence." Id.
98. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (rith Cir. 1996) (affirming judgment under
ATCA against former Ethiopian official for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that alleged war crimes, genocide, torture,
and other atrocities committed by a leader of insurgent Bosnian Serb forces in Bosnia were actionable
under the ATCA in a suit filed by victims in a U.S. District Court in Manhattan); Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (deeming torture, summary execution, "disappearance," and
arbitrary detention by Guatemalan military to be actionable violations under the ATCA); Trajano v.
Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the
plaintiff, an alien, had properly invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under the
ATCA, for a wrongful death action against former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his
daughter, for the torture and murder of a Philippine citizen); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (adhering "to the legal principles established in Filartiga but find[ing]
that factual distinctions preclude reliance on that case to find subject matter jurisdiction" for claims
brought against the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Libyan government, and other entities for
terrorist activities allegedly in violation of the law of nations).
99. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 844 (Eleventh Circuit suit against former Ethiopian official); Kadic, 70
F.3d at 232 (Second Circuit suit against leader of Bosnian Serb insurgency); Trajano, 978 F.2d at 493
(Ninth Circuit suit against former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos).





Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).' 3 The Security Council created
both tribunals pursuant to its power to act in the face of threats to peace,
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 4 The Security
Council established the tribunals to investigate and prosecute
international crimes including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, committed during the Yugoslav and Rwandan civil wars. 5
Each tribunal is located outside the territory of the nation whose crimes
it adjudicates.' °6 The investigations and prosecutions before the tribunals
have raised many new legal issues and have contributed greatly to the
development of international criminal law jurisprudence arising from the
Nuremberg tribunals.'"
4. Modern Developments in National Application of Universal
Criminal Jurisdiction
Use of universal jurisdiction by states has grown more in the 1990s
than in any previous period, stimulated in large part by Eichmann, the
ICTY and ICTR, and Filartiga.°8 Since '99', numerous European states
have exercised universal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against
humanity, including Austria,'" Belgium,"'  Denmark,"' France,"'
Germany, "' The Netherlands,"4 Spain,"5 Switzerland," 6 and the United
Kingdom."7 Of all the state sponsored universal jurisdiction prosecutions,
the most notable, high-profile case is the Pinochet case."
8
Many of these cases in which universal jurisdiction was invoked
103. Id. at 199.
104. PINOCHET EFFECT, supra note 6, at I99. The establishment of the ICrY was partially a reaction
to international outrage at seeing "emaciated concentration camp inmates in the heart of a Europe
that had in living memory vowed 'never again."' Id. Once the ICTY was established, the Security
Council could not ignore a massacre of three quarters of a million Rwandans (mostly of the Tutsi
ethnic minority, or members of the Hutus ethnic majority who opposed the killing). Id. The U.N. was
compelled to address African genocide in the same manner as it had reacted to European genocide.
Id. By creating the tribunals pursuant to the Security Council's Chapter VII power, rather than
through an international treaty, the Security Council could require cooperation from all U.N. member
states. Id.
105. Id.
io6. See id. The ICTR is located in Arusha, Tanzania, and the ICTY is based in The Hague. Id.
107. Id. at xi.
lo8. Id. at 197, 199.
io9. Redress, supra note 73, at 16.
iio. Id. at i8.
iii. Id. at 22.
112. Id. at 24.





I 8. See id. at I ("The Pinochet case has raised the prospect of a person being put on trial in a




differed from past cases in which the crimes were committed in states
where government authority had collapsed."9 The majority of cases
prosecuted arose from "failed states" like Yugoslavia and Rwanda.'2 °
However, European nations have not limited investigations and
prosecutions of universal jurisdiction crimes to the Eastern
Hemisphere.'2' A number of cases have arisen from defunct military
dictatorships in Latin America.'22 Furthermore, in the majority of cases,
the suspect was a national of a state that was politically less powerful in
the international community than the prosecuting state.
2 3
The cases arising out of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda were largely spurred by the immigration of refugees into
European states from all sides of these conflicts, as transplanted victims
began encountering the people who had victimized them in their home
countries.' 4 Most European states enacted legislation to deal with this
problem, including legislation to cooperate in extradition of suspects to
international tribunals, 5 but also to allow for prosecution within national
courts."' However, implementing legislation is not always necessary for
domestic courts to assert universal jurisdiction.2 7
Prosecutions in national courts have included the courts of
Germany, Denmark, Belgium, France, and Switzerland. ' In Germany,
for example, two Bosnian Serbs were convicted in 1997 for crimes against
Muslims in former Yugoslavia.2 9 Novislav Djajic was sentenced to five
years' imprisonment for war crimes he committed.'30 Nikola Jorgic was
sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide and murder.' 3' In 1994, a
I i9. Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 198.
120. Id.; Redress, supra note 73, at 8.
121. Redress, supra note 73, at 8.
122. Id.
123. Bottini, supra note 31, at 556, 559 (noting the cases of Henry Kissinger and Ariel Sharon as
examples of the inability of states to use universal jurisdiction to bring suit against accused who are
nationals of a powerful country); see Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 199.
124. Redress, supra note 73, at 8-12 ("The Experience so Far: Cases in European States in the
199OS").





130. Id. at 28-3o.
The international obligation to prosecute Djajic, required in order to found jurisdiction
under Article 6.9 of the German Penal Code (crimes for which universal jurisdiction is
provided under an international treaty), was the Fourth Geneva Convention Articles 146
and 147, and Additional Protocol One. The Court considered whether victims were
protected persons under Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In this context the
Court determined that the armed conflict was an international one. The Court also found





Danish court convicted Bosnian Muslim Refik Saric for torturing
prisoners of war in a Croat-run prison camp in Bosnia, sentencing him to
incarceration for eight years.'32 And in 1999, a Swiss military court
convicted a Rwandan national for committing war crimes in Rwanda.'33
Both Austria and Switzerland have each tried and acquitted a Bosnian
Serb of war crimes.
34
European domestic courts have also taken up cases of human rights
violations committed during military dictatorships in Latin America,
particularly in Chile and Argentina.'35 However, many of these cases are
not strict examples of jurisdiction based on the universality principle
since many European citizens were victims of torture and disappearance
during these regimes., 6 In addition to cases based on the victimization of
European nationals, cases arose from immigrants living in refugee
communities who were former victims as well.'37 National amnesty laws
removed the possibility of criminal prosecution of former military
leaders and officers following democratic transition in many Latin
American states. 38 It is possible that European courts felt compelled to
investigate and prosecute these crimes since the perpetrators were not
held accountable by their own governments and were living in
impunity."'
Investigations of universal jurisdiction crimes have not been limited
Jurisdiction for genocide was based on Article 6.1 of the Penal Code. Although Article 6 of
the Genocide Convention did not explicitly provide for universal jurisdiction over genocide,
Article 6 of the Convention was generally regarded as not excluding the possibility of
national courts exercising jurisdiction. Because of this, and because the Statue of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia-in relation to which Germany had
enacted a Law on Co-operation-also included jurisdiction over genocide, the Court found
that no prohibition on prosecution could be derived from international law.
Id.
132. Id. at 8-12 ("The Experience so Far: Cases in European States in the s99os").
133. Kastenberg, supra note 77, at I4; Redress, supra note 73, at 8-12 ("The Experience so Far:
Cases in European States in the i99os").
534. Redress, supra note 73, at 8-12 ("The Experience so Far: Cases in European States in the
1990s").
135. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 311, 311 (2001); Redress, supra note 73, at 8-12 ("The Experience so Far: Cases in European
States in the I99os").
136. Redress, supra note 73, at 8-12 ("The Experience so Far: Cases in European States in the
i99os"). In the Pinochet case initiated in Spain, initially all victims listed were Spanish citizens and
descendants of Spanish citizens, although the law did not require it. Roht-Ariaza, supra note 135, at
314. Later, once the case was accepted for investigation, non-Spanish victims were added. Id. The
initial selection of which victims to include was a political decision: "to avoid charges of Spanish court
meddling- and in part to take advantage of Spanish constitutional mandates to the courts to do justice
for Spanish citizens." Id. at 315.
137. Redress, supra note 73, at 8-12 ("The Experience so Far: Cases in European States in the
199os").
138. Id.




to situations where the perpetrator is already found within the country."
Several investigations have been initiated against persons not physically
present. 4' Investigation into the crimes of the former Chilean military
dictator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in numerous European states was the
most notable example of investigation in absentia.42 Spain, France,"
Belgium,' and Switzerland16 initiated criminal investigations against
Pinochet and then sought his extradition from the United Kingdom,'47
where he was arrested while in London seeking medical treatment.'4 The
House of Lords affirmed that the principle of universal jurisdiction
would apply and held that, as a matter of U.K. law, a former head of
state is not immune (despite the doctrine of head-of-state immunity)
from criminal charges of official torture committed during the time he
was in power. 49 For health reasons, Pinochet was deemed unfit to stand
trial and was allowed to return to Chile, but the international
investigations served as a catalyst for political change in Chile regarding
140. Id.
141. Id. However, although France allows trials in absentia, the French Cour de Cassation ruled in
March 1996 that French courts could only exercise universal jurisdiction over suspects of international
crimes that France was obligated to prosecute under international treaties when the accused was
present in France. Id. French courts have instigated proceedings without the accused present in France
when jurisdiction was based on the passive personality principle. Id. For example, France tried,
convicted, and sentenced Argentine Captain Alfredo Astiz in absentia for his participation in the
torture and disappearance of two French nuns in Argentina. Id.
142. Id. Similarly, in the case of Argentine Navy Officer Adolfo Scilingo, Scilingo was arrested at a
later stage in a Spanish investigation for throwing political opponents out of airplanes. Id.
143. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 136.
i44. France's case was based on the passive personality principle, for the torture and
disappearance of four French nationals in Chile during Pinochet's dictatorship. Redress, supra note 73,
at 24-28.
145. The Belgium case was based on universal jurisdiction, and involved Chilean citizens living in
Europe. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 135, at 315.
146. Switzerland based jurisdiction on the passive personality principle, following a complaint by a
widow whose husband (with dual Swiss and Chilean nationality) disappeared in Chile in 1977-
Redress, supra note 73, at 41-44.
147. Redress, supra note 73, at 8-12 ("The Experience so Far: Cases in European States in the
I99Os").
148. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 135, at 312.
149. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998] 3
W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.D), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1302 , 1334, 1338-39 (1998); see
also Redress, supra note 73, § b ("The Experience so Far: Cases in European States in the i99Os");
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 135, at 312. A second House of Lords decision approved the extradition, but
limited the extraditable charges to those that alleged torture occurring after 1988, which was the date
the United Kingdom passed legislation to implement the Convention Against Torture on which
universal jurisdiction over torture was based in Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L.), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 430 (I999). A
third decision in the Pinochet case, from the Appeal Chamber of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional,
composed of eleven judges, affirmed Spanish jurisdiction over that case and other Argentine and
Chilean cases, finding that domestic amnesty laws did not bind the Spanish courts. Roht-Arriaza,
supra note 135, at 313.
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amnesty laws.' 5' The Supreme Court of Chile stripped Pinochet of
immunity from prosecution there, and a trial judge instigated an
investigation, with over 170 separate complaints pending.'5'
II. GERMAN UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: U.S. OFFICIALS'
VULNERABILITY FOR ACTIONS IN IRAQ
In many European countries, including Germany, a victim can
initiate a criminal proceeding and appeal to a court if the prosecutor
refuses to go forward.'52 This is how the CCR, on its own behalf and
representing four Iraqi torture victims, was able to petition a German
prosecutor to open an investigation.'53 The CCR chose to file in
Germany, as opposed to a handful of other European countries with
similar universal jurisdiction codes, due to the favorability of German
law and because some of the named defendants were present or
stationed at U.S. military bases in Germany at times during the Iraq
War.'54 Since the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute, the
ICC was not an available forum.'55 Furthermore, because no other
international courts have jurisdiction over these alleged war crimes, a
national court with universal jurisdiction over war crimes was the last
resort.'
A. GERMAN UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER WAR CRIMES
Germany's Code of Crimes Against International Law (CCAIL),
passed in 2002, grants German courts universal jurisdiction over cases of
war crimes and crimes against humanity.'57 The CCAIL does not require
any connection between Germany and either the perpetrator of a war
i5o. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 135, at 315.
15. Id. A similar process occurred in Argentina, with cases based on kidnapping children of the
disappeared. The European investigations encouraged Argentine magistrates to renew efforts to
gather new evidence in cases that had been languishing for lack of evidence. A number of high-level
Argentine ex-military officials were jailed or placed under house arrest as a result, including Videla,
Massera, and Suarez-Mason. Id. New or reinstigated investigations have begun in Uruguay, Brazil and
Paraguay as well. Id at 317. The U.S. Department of Justice reopened a stale investigation into the
case of the Letelier bombing in Washington, D.C., which was believed to have been tied to Pinochet's
military government. Id.
152. Id. at 318; Litigating Against Torture, supra note i. In the United States, prosecutors retain
complete discretion in filing a criminal case. Id.
153. Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
154. Id. Approximately 70,000 troops are stationed in Germany, many of whom have been
deployed to Iraq, "rotat[ing] into and out of Iraq from German bases." Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld,
supra note 2. Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, named in the suit, was the former U.S. commander in Iraq
and has been stationed in Germany as commander of the Army's 5th Corps. Id.
155. Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
156. Id.
157. CCAIL, supra note 3, §§ t, 6-12; ROT ARRIAZA, supra note 6, at 191; Mohamed M. El Zeidy,
Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia: Is It a Legal Valid Option for Repressing Heinous Crimes?, 37 INT'L
LAW. 835, 848 (2003); Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2.
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crime or the victim in order to prosecute. s The code covers not just
direct commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, but
reaches the conduct of military or civilian leaders who fail to prevent the
commission of these crimes by their subordinates.'59
i. War Crimes
The German CCAIL is consistent with the definition of crimes
codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.'
6,
CCAIL criminalizes acts which constitute grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions as well as violations of the laws of war under customary
international law.'6' Under CCAIL, both torture and inhumane
treatment of detainees are deemed war crimes. '
An example of a "criminal act" under the German CCAIL is the use
of unmuzzled dogs in Abu Ghraib to threaten detainees.' 63 Under
CCAIL, not only would the soldier who committed the act be guilty of a
war crime, but superior officers who ordered or authorized the use of
dogs in this manner would also be guilty of war crimes.' 64 Evidence exists
in the public record of Rumsfeld and Sanchez authorizing the use of dogs
in interrogations. If proven that superiors directly ordered dogs to be
158. CCAIL, supra note 3, § I; ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 6, at 19I; Litigating Against Torture,
supra note i. However, section 153f of the Code of Criminal Procedure instructs the public prosecutor
to exercise discretion in proceeding with cases in which there is not a tie to Germany, and to defer to
an international court or state that does have ties to the crime, defendant or victim. ROHT-ARRIAZA,
supra note 6, at 191; see also Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before National
Courts and International Tribunals, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 124, 127 (2005) ("[T]he prosecutor is free to
prosecute or not to prosecute where the crimes are committed outside Germany by a non-German
against a non-German national and the perpetrator is not expected to enter Germany."); Ryan
Rabinovitch, Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 500, 508 (2005) ("[C]ourts have
held that in order for the federation to exercise universal normative jurisdiction there must be some
'link' between the accused and the State, such as the presence of the accused in the country."). But see
ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 6, at 191 (stating that the CCAIL does "allow cases without a nationality or
presence link in extraordinary circumstances"); El Zeidy, supra note 157, at 848.
"Section I [of CCAIL] permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction to genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, despite the fact that the offences have no specific link to Germany."
Professor Gerhard Werle therefore argues that the "'deviating jurisprudence' which set out the
requirement of 'the additional link to Germany' has no standing for the application of the [CCAIL]."
El Zeidy, supra note 157, at 848.
159. CCAIL, supra note 3, § 4; Lawsuit Against Rumsfeld, supra note 2.
16o. Litigating Against Torture, supra note i (stating that CCAIL "more or less parallels" the ICC
definitions).
161. Id.
162. CCAIL, supra note 3, §§ 8(l)(3), 8(1)(9). Under CCAIL, war crimes include: "treat[ing] a
person who is to be protected under international humanitarian law cruelly or inhumanely by causing
him or her substantial physical or mental harm or suffering, especially by torturing or mutilating that
person," and "treat[ing] a person who is to be protected under international humanitarian law in a
gravely humiliating or degrading manner." Id.; see also Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
163. Litigating Against Torture, supra note s.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETING AWAY WITH TORTURE? 32-35 (2O05), available at
http:/lhrw.orgreports/zoo5/uso4o5/uso4o5.pdf [hereinafter HRW REPORT 2]. The report documents
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used against detainees, these officials would be directly responsible for
war crimes and possibly punished by imprisonment in Germany. '66
Under CCAIL, in the absence of evidence of direct orders, superiors
may still be held accountable for war crimes, as indirectly responsible, if
they were aware of torture and abuse and either failed to prevent the
crimes or failed to bring the guilty to justice.6 ' Evidence exists that the
abuse in Iraq was brought to the attention of high-level U.S. officials by
internal officers and officials,'68 and by external entities such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).' 6' However, no
action was taken by these high-level officials to stop the crimes or punish
the perpetrators.'7 °
2. Jurisdiction
In addition to the universal jurisdiction principle codified in CCAIL,
which gives Germany the right to try war criminals with no connection to
that Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the following techniques, which were an "unprecedented
expansion of army doctrine," to be used on detainees in Guantdnamo Bay:
" "The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours";
" "Isolation up to 3o days";
" "The detainee may also have a hood placed over his head during transportation and
questioning";
" "Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli";
" "Removal of all comfort items (including religious items)";
" "Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc)";
" "Removal of clothing"; and
" "Using detainees' individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress."
Id. at 32-33 (citing memorandum from Jerald Phifer to Commander of Joint Task Force 17o, Request
for Approval of Counter-resistance Techniques (Oct. 11, 2002) (attached to memorandum from
William J. Haynes II to Sec'y of Def., Counter-resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002) (approved by
memorandum from Secretary Rumsfeld i (Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/nation/documents/dodmemos.pdf))). Secretary Rumsfeld appended a handwritten note to his
authorization of these techniques: "However, I stand for 8-so hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4
hours?" HRW REPORT 2, supra, at n.1o5. Illegal methods of interrogation approved by Rumseld for
use in Guantnamo were later used in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id. at 37-38 ("At Abu Ghraib, of course,
the techniques put into play by Secretary Rumsfeld, such as the use of dogs, figured prominently in the
war crimes committed against detainees.") The report further documented:
On September 14, 2003, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez,
implemented Gen. Miller's proposals by adopting a policy that brought back into play the
techniques which Secretary Rumsfeld had approved in December 2002 for use at
Guant~namo. Gen. Sanchez's memo authorized 29 interrogation techniques, including the
"presence of military working dog: Exploits Arab fear of dogs while maintaining security
during interrogations," and sleep deprivation, both approved by Secretary Rumsfeld for
Guantdnamo.
Id. at 42 (citing memorandum from Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lieutenant General, to Combined Joint Staff
Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq, and Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad, Iraq,
CJTF-7 ;Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (Sept. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17851&c=2o6).
166. Litigating Against Torture, supra note i.
167. Id.





the German forum, German law mandates investigations of war crimes in
cases that do in fact have ties to Germany.7 ' Investigation and
prosecution of war criminals who are living within German territory is
obligatory.'72
The U.S. military maintains large bases in Germany.' 73 The 205 th
intelligence brigade, which was involved in the abuse of detainees in Abu
Ghraib, is stationed in Wiesbaden. U.S. Army Colonel Pappas, the
leader of the 205th brigade, was also stationed at Wiesbaden and was
allegedly involved in the Abu Ghraib abuse. 174 Lieutenant General
Ricardo Sanchez and his deputy, Major General Walter Wojdakowski,
led the Army's V Corp and were stationed at Heidelberg. 75 The V Corp
was the Army's occupying force at the time of the Abu Ghraib scandal.'76
U.S. Army presence in Germany before and during the time that crimes
were committed at Abu Ghraib adds additional weight to the argument





173. Id. The 1951 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, and the 1959 Agreement to Supplement the Agreement Between the Parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces with Respect to Foreign Forces
Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, govern the status of U.S. forces in Germany. Gennady
M. Danilenko, The Statute of the International Criminal Court and Third States, 21 MIcH. J. INT'L L.
445, 474 (20o0); see also German Federal Foreign Office, The Status of Foreign Forces in Germany, at
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/vn/voelkerrecht/truppenstationierung-html#3
(last visited Oct. 6, 2005). The agreements provide the basic legal framework defining immunities for
military personnel stationed abroad. Danilenko, supra, at 474. The "sending" State's military
personnel do not enjoy absolute immunity to all crimes, but do have partial immunity to prosecution
for crimes committed while stationed in Germany. Id. Under Article VII of the 1951 NATO
Agreement, U.S. forces stationed in Germany may be subject to German criminal jurisdiction. Id.
However, the United States has the "primary right" to exercise jurisdiction over "offences arising out
of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty." Id. It is not clear who determines
what constitutes "official duty." Id. In the majority of cases, "receiving" States accept the judgment of
the sending State as to whether the offense of the sending State's citizen arose out of the performance
of "official duty." Id. at 474-75. However, there seems to be no legal obligation to accept the sending
State's determination, and the receiving State's courts may determine whether the offense was
committed within the scope of official duty. Id. at 475; see also Dieter Fleck, Are Foreign Military
Personnel Exempt from International Criminal Jurisdiction Under Status of Forces Agreements?, I J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 651, 659-60 (2003). The 1959 NATO Agreement provides that the determination
shall be made "in accordance with the law of the sending state and that the German court or authority
'shall make its decision in conformity with' the certificate of the military authority of the sending
state." Id. But in "exceptional cases," a certificate may be made the subject of review through
"'discussions between the Federal Government and the diplomatic mission in the Federal Republic of
the sending State."' Id.






3. Unwillingness of the Primary Jurisdiction to Investigate
Authority to investigate universal jurisdiction cases in Germany is
dependent on a finding that the state with "primary jurisdiction" is
unwilling to conduct its own investigation."" Since U.S. officials were
alleged to have committed crimes in the complaint, the United States
would have primary jurisdiction over these crimes.'79 The German
prosecutor could act only if he found the United States "unwilling" to
investigate and prosecute the high-level officials named in the
complaint.'8°
The Bush administration has allowed investigation and prosecution
of low-level soldiers who were directly involved and whose documented
involvement was on film.' 8' However, in press briefings and statements,
the administration has asserted that officers in the chain of command and
civilians in the Pentagon (such as Rumsfeld) were not involved in the
torture and abuse of detainees. 8' The administration has continued to
demonstrate an unwillingness to investigate up the chain of command.""
B. U.S. ACTIONS IN IRAQ: "WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS" OR
WAR CRIMES?
The photos that emerged from Abu Ghraib were sinister and
shocking. The actions were brazen. Capturing those acts on film was
intended, not covert. The photographs told a story, but one that was
open to interpretation. Questions remained. Why were these acts of
torture and degradation discovered when usually such abuse remains
carefully hidden behind closed doors? Why did the soldiers involved
appear to feel justified in their actions?
Perhaps the soldiers believed, at the time, that they were not doing






183. Id.; HRW REPORT 2, supra note 165, at 19-25. The report summarized the investigations
conducted by the Pentagon and stated:
In the wake of the Abu Ghraib abuses, the Pentagon established no fewer than seven
investigations .... Almost all of them involved the military investigating itself. None of the
military probes was aimed higher up the chain of command than Gen. Sanchez, the top
U.S. soldier in Iraq. None of the investigations had the task of examining the role of the
CIA or of civilian authorities.
Id. at 19. The report also observed that "[all but one [of the seven investigations] ... was focused on
only one aspect or another of the treatment of detainees. None took on the task of examining the role
of civilian leaders who might have had ultimate authority over detainee treatment policy." Id. at 4.
184. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRA1B 3 (June 2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2oo4/usao6o4/usao6o4.pdf [hereinafter HRW REPORT I] (Soldiers "felt they
had nothing to hide"); see also id. at i ("This pattern of abuse did not result from the acts of individual
soldiers who broke the rules. It resulted from decisions made by the Bush administration to bend,
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incidents but represented patterns of abuse taking place in U.S.
detention centers created for "enemy combatants" in the war on terror.
85
Incidents of abuse have been documented in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba,
Afghanistan and throughout detention centers in Iraq. 
86
i. The "War on Terror" Policy of the Bush Administration
Human Rights Watch (HRW) maintained in a 2004 report, "The
Road to Abu Ghraib" (HRW Report), that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was
a direct result of Bush administration policies emerging from and
supporting the war on terror. ' HRW lawyers argue that administration
policies created the climate for Abu Ghraib in three fundamental ways.
First, the administration seemed to believe that winning the war on
terror would not be possible within the confines of international law.' 
8
Therefore, the administration pursued legal strategies, undermining the
intent and language of the Geneva Conventions, to argue that: I)
international law on treatment of prisoners of war and detainees was not
"technically" applicable in the war on terror;' 89 2) the need to protect
ignore, or cast rules aside.").
185. Id. at i. The report states:
[T]he only exceptional aspect of the abuse at Abu Ghraib may have been that it was
photographed. Detainees in U.S. custody in Afghanistan have testified that they
experienced treatment similar to what happened in Abu Ghraib-from beatings to
prolonged sleep and sensory deprivation to being held naked-as early as 2002.
Comparable-and, indeed, more extreme-cases of torture and inhuman treatment have
been extensively documented by the International Committee of the Red Cross and by
journalists at numerous locations in Iraq outside Abu Ghraib.
Id.; see also id. at 25 ("Procedures used in Afghanistan and Guantinamo were imported to Iraq,
including the use of 'stress and duress' tactics and the use of prison guards to set the conditions for the
interrogation of detainees.").
i86. See id. at 1, 25.
187. Id. at i.
188. Id.
189. Whether or not detainees in U.S. custody merit the prisoner of war status to qualify for many
of the protections of the Geneva Conventions, all persons are protected by common article 3, which is
identical in each of the four Geneva Conventions:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
i. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth,
or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
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national security justified any breach of international law; and, 3) laws
impeding the President's exercise of commander-in-chief power in
"fighting" the war on terror might even be unconstitutional.'"
Second, the United States expanded the list of permissible
interrogation techniques for purposes of getting better information from
detainees.'9 ' The new methods included: use of "painful stress positions";
deprivation of sleep and light for extended periods of time; exposure to
extreme heat, cold, noise and light; "hooding"; and denial of clothing.'92
These methods were utilized systematically in Afghanistan and Iraq.'93
Use of "water boarding," in which a person is held underwater to
simulate drowning, was also documented as a method used contingent on
special, individualized approval.'94
Third, the Bush administration was unresponsive to reports and
allegations of abuse.'95 For example, rather than address concerns
articulated by of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
to the Coalition Forces, Army officials responded by attempting to limit
the ICRC's access to detention centers.' The cumulative effect of this
policy was to create an environment in which U.S. military personnel
might have reasonably believed that the new interrogation techniques
employed for the war on terror were authorized and lawful.
2. U.S. Interrogation Techniques at Abu Ghraib
The ICRC in its February 2004 report found that "methods of
physical and psychological coercion were used by the military
intelligence in a systematic way to gain confessions and extract
information."'97 The ICRC documented the following methods of
interrogation:
hooding to disorient and prevent detainees from breathing freely
being forced to remain for prolonged periods in painful stress positions
being attached repeatedly over several days for several hours each time
to the bars of cell doors naked or in positions causing physical pain
being held naked in dark cells for several days and paraded naked,
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 3 (emphasis added).
19o. HRW REPORT I, supra note 184, at 1-2.




195. Id. at 3.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 25 (quoting INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT BY
THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION, Feb. 2004.)
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sometimes hooded or with women's underwear over their heads
sleep, food, and water deprivation
prolonged exposure while hooded to the sun during the hottest time of
day'
9
A classified investigative military report compiled by Major General
Antonio Taguba confirmed the ICRC's findings and documented even
more types of abuse.' 9 His report stated that "numerous incidents of
sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" were inflicted on several
detainees."
3. Involvement of U.S. Officials
Whether or not the Bush administration's policy contributed to or
was responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib, significant evidence exists
that, at the very least, senior officials had knowledge that abuse was
198. Id. at 25-26.
199. Id. at 26. Abuse documented in the Taguba report included:
" Punching, slapping and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;
" Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
" Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for
photographing;
" Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being
photographed and videotaped;
" Arranging naked detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;
" Positioning a naked detainee on a box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching
wires to his fingers, toes and penis to simulate electric torture;
" Writing "I am a Rapist" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped
a 15-year-old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;
" Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck and having a female
soldier pose with him for a picture;
" A male military police guard having sex with a female detainee;
" Breaking chemical lights and pouring phosphoric liquid on detainees;
" Threatening detainees with a loaded 9-mm pistol;
" Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
" Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
" Threatening male detainees with rape;
" Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured
after being slammed against the wall in his cell;
" Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick;
" Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to frighten and intimidate detainees
with threats of attack, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a
detainee;
" Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several
days at a time;
" Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;
" Taking pictures of dead Iraqi detainees.
Id. at 26-27.
200. Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
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occurring and failed to take actions to arrest it.2"' Organizations including
HRW and the ICRC petitioned the U.S. government to take action to
stop the abusive practices that were coming to light in the media and
through their own investigations.2"' Reports of abuse from within the
military ranks were also ignored." In fact, interviews with soldiers
stationed at Abu Ghraib indicated that soldiers were left with the
impression that anyone proffering evidence of abuse would be subject to
retaliation in the form of criminal charges, "hazing and harassment," or
"potential exposure and 'friendly fire' death" on the battlefield. 4
Soldiers who did come forward about abuse in Iraq were subject to
"ridicule and threat," including one case in which a soldier was found to
be "mentally deranged" after filing a report of severe abuse, and was
"strapped to a gurney and... flown out of Iraq.""°5
Furthermore, evidence exists demonstrating that senior officials
made decisions that resulted in or contributed to the abusive actions
taken on the ground in Iraq. For example, in the early stages of the
occupation of Iraq, senior officials were dissatisfied with the quality of
intelligence being produced from interrogations taking place"(S Evidence
indicates that senior officials sent pressure down the chain of command
to improve the information being extracted from detainees." For
201. Id. at 27-28 ("From the earliest days of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the U.S. government has
been aware of allegations of abuses, including the death of some 30 persons in detention. Yet soldiers
accused of abuse have-until after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke-escaped judicial punishment.").
202. See id. at 3-4.
203. See Horton, Expert Report, supra note i8, para. 12 (describing interviews with soldiers
stationed in Germany during May 2004, who were part of the military intelligence units previously
stationed, or present, at Abu Ghraib). Horton also describes a visit he received from a delegation of
senior uniformed military lawyers in May 2003 (whose identities remain confidential) in his capacity as
Chair for the Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
("Bar Association"):
The visitors advised me at that time that important policy decisions had been taken in the
office of secretary of defense ("OSD") which were calculated to, and would, lead to the
abuse of detainees held in the Global War on Terror ("GWOT"). They cited a number of
specific decisions concerning the involvement of civilian contractors in the interrogation
process, as well as the disengagement of military lawyers from a "watchdog" role in the
interrogation facilities. These decisions, they said, "served no legitimate policy purpose." It
was clear at the time that there were other decisions, probably reflected in secret or
classified documents, which caused severe concern but which the officers were not a liberty
to discuss. They further noted that military lawyers were being continuously circumvented
in the process of policy analysis, presumably because they had consistently raised objection
to initiatives of Rumsfeld on grounds that they were inconsistent with, or would violate, the
law of armed conflict. The visitors sought the engagement of the organs of the legal
profession with these issues with the hope that the Administration would resume the
observance of standards firmly dictated by law and common decency.
Id. para. 4. Following this visit, the Bar Association raised concerns directly with the Department of
Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and oversight organs of
Congress. Id.
204. Horton, Expert Report, supra note 18, para. 12.
205. Id. (citing David Debatto, Whitewashing Torture?, at www.salon.com (Dec. 8, 2004)).
206. Id. para. 16; see also HRW REPORT I, supra note 184, at 3.
207. See Horton, Expert Report, supra note i8, para. 16; see also HRW REPORT I, supra note 184, at
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instance, at a Pentagon intelligence briefing in summer 2003 (at which
Rumsfeld, Stephen Cambone, William Boykin and other senior officers
were present), Rumsfeld reportedly "complained loudly about the
quality of the intelligence" coming out of Iraq11 He reportedly
compared it to the more useful intelligence being gained at Guantinamo,
following the introduction of new "extreme" interrogation techniques. °
Rumsfeld allegedly expressed "anger and frustration over the application
of Geneva Convention Rules in Iraq," and verbally ordered Major
General Geoffrey Miller from Guantdnamo to Iraq "to 'Gitmoize' the
intelligence gathering operations there.".. "Gitmoize" reportedly refers
to the introduction of Guantdnamo interrogation techniques in Iraq."'
After Rumsfeld's decision to "step up the hunt for 'actionable
intelligence' in Iraq, the officer responsible for intelligence in
Guantfinamo was re-deployed to Iraq, and teams of interrogators from
Guantdnamo arrived at Abu Ghraib."2 The commanding general in Iraq
issued orders to "manipulate an internee's emotions and weaknesses,"
and military intelligence ordered military police to "set physical and
mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses..... A captain
who previously was in charge of interrogation at "an Afghan detention
center where two prisoners died in detention posted 'Interrogation Rules
of Engagement' at Abu Ghraib. ' 4 These rules authorized coercive
practices of interrogation "such as the use of military guard dogs to instill
fear," which violates the Geneva Conventions and the Convention
Against Torture."5 Following these changes in policy and practice, the
severest abuses at Abu Ghraib were committed."
III. ELIMINATING IMPUNITY AND AVOIDING FOREIGN PROSECUTION:
CHECKING THE "CHECKS AND BALANCES"
Recent experience with transnational investigations and
prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction suggests that their principal
value is the ability to stimulate investigations and prosecutions
domestically."7 Transnational investigations focus international attention
on the government's incapacity or unwillingness to address human rights
violations, force the government to defend its judicial system, and
3.









217. PINOCHET EFFECT, supra note 6, at 223.
1Vol. 57:423
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
empower domestic lawyers and activists demanding accountability at
home."18 The primary goal of transnational prosecutions should be to
force the hand of national officials to establish legitimate investigations
and, where necessary, prosecutions, to hold the architects and
perpetrators of atrocities accountable for their actions."9
The United States has primary jurisdiction over alleged war crimes
of senior U.S. officials and officers. The perceived willingness of the U.S.
government to investigate the charges filed in the CCR's complaint was
the lynchpin issue and stated reason for the German prosecutor's
decision not to move forward with an investigation. Whether or not this
was a legitimate legal concern of the prosecutor and/or a legal
justification for a political solution to a foreign relations crisis with the
United States, the United States' willingness to investigate and prosecute
those individuals suspected of war crimes is the simple solution to a
complex set of problems. The United States' implementation of
independent investigative mechanisms that are not subject to political
manipulation would serve the purposes of: I) ensuring that the United
States does not become a safe haven for American war criminals; 2)
preserving the image of the United States as a law-abiding state; and 3)
eliminating the vulnerability of U.S. citizens to criminal prosecution in
unfamiliar foreign forums for participation in U.S. military operations,
where U.S. constitutional guarantees that Americans count on (such as
trial by jury) may or may not apply.
A. UNWILLINGNESS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE AND
PROSECUTE
In his expert report filed with the complaint to the German
prosecutor, Scott Horton, Chair of the Committee on International Law
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, provides a
number of reasons why U.S. investigation of senior officials is unlikely to
occur.22 First, the Department of Defense's criminal investigatory
functions are under the complete authority of the Secretary of Defense
who is the principal defendant in this case.2 ' Because Rumsfeld has
"convening authority" over these mechanisms, he effectively has
immunity from investigation.
Second, the criminal investigations that are currently underway
pursuant to Army Regulation 15-6 effectively serve only to investigate
down the chain of command. 3 The investigation does not look up the
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Horton, Expert Report, supra note i8, para. 3.
221. Id. para. 3.I.
222. Id. paras. 3.1, 9.
223. Id. para. 3.2. See generally id. paras. 9-i9 (describing U.S. military criminal justice system).
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chain of command, which protects higher-level officers and officials from
accountability for their participation in the misconduct.224
Third, the criminal investigations of lower-level officers were
influenced from above. 25 The intent was to "whitewash" the culpability
of those in higher command."6
Fourth, limiting criminal prosecution to the lowest-ranking
participants indicates a "continuing scheme in corruption of the military
criminal justice system," the purpose of which is to eclipse the role
played by higher-level officers and officials. 27 In interviews that Horton
conducted with soldiers regarding the court martial hearings in Ft. Hood,
Texas, soldiers indicated that "they had a clear understanding from [the
court martial] process, that it wasn't the abuse of prisoners which was
being punished, but the fact that the military, and particularly Rumsfeld,
has been embarrassed by these matters becoming public." '',
Fifth, responsibility for oversight, which is constitutionally vested in
the legislative branch, has been abdicated. 9 This was demonstrated by
the actions of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which initially
convened hearings on prisoner abuse, but never followed through with
the inquiry. 3 ° After a series of meetings with Republican congressional
leaders, the Chair of the Committee, Senator John Warner, expressed
concern that an investigation might interfere with the nation's war
effort."'
Sixth, the War Crimes Act gives prosecutorial discretion to the
Attorney General and the U.S. Attorneys. 32 Not only was former
Attorney General John Ashcroft implicated in the conspiracy to commit
war crimes, his replacement, Alberto Gonzales, was the principal author
of a "scheme" to commit war crimes. 33 Gonzales's memorandum dated
January 25, 2005, expressly noted that "he was motivated by a well-
founded fear of war crimes prosecution" under U.S. law, which he
"sought to evade for the benefit of himself and others in the
Administration."'34
Finally, Department of Justice (DOJ) officers who have raised the
issue of war crimes culpability have been "disciplined, reprimanded, and
224. Id.
225. Id. para. 3.3. See generally id. paras. 9-i9 (describing U.S. military criminal justice system).
226. Id. para. 3.3.
227. Id. para. 3.4.
228. Id. para. i8.
229. Id. paras. 3.5, 20.
230. Id. paras. 3.5. 20-23.
231. Id. para. 22.
232. Id. paras. 3.6, 25.




subjected to a malicious campaign of harassment." '35 This indicates that
the DOJ is unwilling to address the issue of responsibility for war
crimes.36 Therefore, because the criminal investigative and prosecutorial
functions are currently controlled by the same officials who are
implicated in the conspiracy to commit war crimes, criminal investigation
or prosecution is unlikely to occur in the near future.
B. THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT MECHANISMS FOR INVESTIGATION
Since current administration officials are implicated in war crimes,
an independent investigative mechanism must be established to preclude
political interference with the initiation and pursuit of a criminal
investigation.37 One source of independent investigative authority, which
was intended to serve as a "check and balance" upon the executive
branch's investigative and prosecutorial authority, was the special
prosecutor function. ,8 The Independent Counsel Act allowed for the
appointment of a special prosecutor; however, the Act expired in I999."3
Currently, no mechanism exists under American law to force an
independent investigation of alleged misconduct by the executive
branch.40
235. Id. paras. 3.7, 29.
236. Id. para. 3.7.
237. See HRW REPORT 2, supra note 165, at 83, stating that:
Under the civilian justice system, criminal enforcement is committed to the U.S.
Department of Justice and, in particular, to the Attorney General-Alberto Gonzales.
Under the military justice system, criminal investigations may be undertaken by command
authority, with the Secretary of Defense-Donald Rumsfeld-as the ultimate authority.
Given that the two people who can trigger investigations and prosecutions for the alleged
war crimes and acts of torture discussed in this report have been deeply involved in the
policies leading to these alleged crimes, if not in the crimes themselves, it is extremely
unlikely that any such investigations will be undertaken.
238. See Horton, Expert Report, supra note 18, para. 3.8.
239. HRW REPORT 2, supra note 165, at 83; see, e.g., L. Darnell Weeden, A Post-Impeachment
Indictment of the Independent Counsel Statute, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 536, 536 n.2 (2OO). The Independent
Counsel law was established in 1978 as the Ethics in Government Act with a five-year sunset
provision. Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-
598 (1982)). Each time the law was extended it contained the five-year sunset provision. 28 U.S.C.
§ 599. In 1994 the law received its last extension with its customary sunset provision in the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, lO8 Stat. 732 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599) (994)). As a result of the sunset provision contained in its last
extension the independent counsel finally expired in June 199, twenty-one years after it was originally
enacted into law. Id.
240. Horton, Expert Report, supra note 18. para. 3.8. Under U.S. Department of Justice
regulations, the Attorney General must appoint a special counsel from outside the government to
investigate criminal matters in which the department may have a conflict of interest when a three-
prong test is met. 28 C.F.R. § 6oo.1 (2004). First, a "criminal investigation of a person or matter [must
be] warranted." Id. Second, the "investigation or prosecution of that person or matter by a United
States Attorney's Office or litigating Division of the Department of Justice would present a conflict of
interest for the Department." Id. Third, "under the circumstances, it would be in the public interest to
appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for the matter." Id. If the regulation's
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Recent history has shown that the special prosecutor role can itself
be subject to political manipulations. 4 ' To avoid any future threat that
the special prosecutor's authority would be abused, more checks and
balances must be built into the oversight of this type of a role. For
example, the special prosecutor could be limited to investigation of
criminal violations implicating foreign affairs, affecting international
relations, or occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, since the foreign affairs power is broadly vested in the executive
branch. To lessen the threat of political wrangling in the initiation and
appointment of a special prosecutor, the invocation of the law could
require direct Supreme Court oversight, such as the approval of a
minimum number of Supreme Court justices to initiate an appointment,
and agreement by some majority of justices to ratify the appointment of
the specific individual to the position."' Having an effective mechanism
three-prong test is met, then the Attorney General is to select a special counsel from outside the
government. Id. Based on these regulations, Human Rights Watch, the American Bar Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, Human Rights First, and other
groups have called for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate these crimes. See HRW
REPORT 2, supra note 165, at 83-84. Despite the existence of Department of Justice regulations, and
political pressure to comply with them, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has not appointed a
special counsel to investigate.
241. See, e.g., Lanny J. Davis, Spinning Out of Control: The Scandal Machine, 6o MD. L. REV. 41,
52-53 (2001).
We have seen that the use of the appearance of impropriety as a standard for judging
politicians can be slippery and subjective, and that when combined with the power of the
Independent Counsel Act, before its merciful expiration in 1999, it can be profoundly
dangerous to our democratic system of justice. But even without the misuse of this statute
by a prosecutor who has lost all perspective and reasonable discretion, such as Donald
Smaltz, the Act became probably the most insidious element of the post-Watergate scandal
machine; it gave the machine its most terrible, terrifying, and potentially destructive power.
This is because the Independent Counsel Act, as it evolved in the I98os and 199os, became
the instrument of choice in the political arena to serve partisan purposes. The Act was used
by both parties-first, by the Democrats, and then, in the Clinton years, by the Republicans.
The view of the Act from the start depended very much on whose political ox was being
gored.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority
to Cancel Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395,
409 n.124 (2000) (citing Fix the Law, Ditch Starr, N.Y. Daily News, June 30, 1999, at 34, for the
proposition that "the law should be fixed, rather than abolished, because the Justice Department can
not fairly prosecute executive officials").
242. Formerly, under the expired Independent Counsel law, a Special Division of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was created to appoint independent counsel. 28 U.S.C.
§ 49 0 993 & Supp. 2005). The Chief Justice of the United States determined which three Circuit Court
Judges or Justices would sit on the Special Division, with the requirement that one appointment must
be a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. Appointments lasted for a
two-year period. Id. The Special Division was required to appoint an appropriate independent counsel
and specify the scope of his or her prosecutorial jurisdiction, upon receipt of an application requesting
the appointment of independent counsel from the Attorney General. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (993). The
appointment must be an individual who does not hold any office of profit or trust under the U.S.
government. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2) (993). Congress may "request in writing that the Attorney
General apply for the appointment of an independent counsel" if a majority of the majority party
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to initiate an independent, non-politically-motivated investigation, and
prosecution if warranted, would serve both the conservative and liberal
agendas of protecting a citizen who is threatened by prosecution abroad,
and ensuring that impunity finds no safe haven in American politics.
CONCLUSION
Over the long term, if the international community gains the
perception that the United States allows heinous war crimes to go
unpunished, the willingness of nations to apply their universal
jurisdiction laws to U.S. suspects found within their territories could very
well increase, especially when the victims are citizens of those nations
(citizens of almost forty-five different nations were held in
Guantdnamo).243 If this happens, long-awaited retirement plans to travel
around the world might be thwarted for former U.S. officials and
officers. For those former public servants, the U.S. safe haven might start
looking a lot more like an isolated island. Ordinary citizens might even
become deterred from going into public office by the threat of becoming
embroiled in scandals beyond their control with international
implications. The creation of an independent prosecutor function, with
the appropriate checks and balances on its investigative and
prosecutorial authority, would provide a long-term solution to the
problem of protecting U.S. citizens while simultaneously holding them
accountable.
members or of the minority party members of the Committee on the Judiciary of either house of
Congress agrees to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(1) (1993).
243. More than 700 detainees from forty-four nations were held incommunicado at Guantsnamo
Bay. Lord Johan Steyan, a judicial member of Britain's House of Lords, referred to Guantinamo as a
"legal black hole." HRW REPORT I, supra note 184, at 13. Incommunicado detention facilitates
conditions in which abuse is more likely to take place. Id. at 14. The Human Rights Committee, which
is the United Nations entity that monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, states:
To guarantee the effective protection of detained persons, provisions should be made for
detainees to be held in places officially recognized as places of detention and for their
names and places of detention, as well as for the names of persons responsible for their
detention, to be kept in registers readily available and accessible to those concerned,
including relatives and friends.
Id. at 14 n.3I (citation omitted).
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